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NUCLEAR TEST BAN T R EATY

MESS A GE
FROM

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
TRANSMITTING
THE TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE, AND UNDERWATER, SIGNED AT
MOSCOW ON AUGUST 5, 1963, ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND
NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS

AUGUST 8, 1963.- Treaty was read the first time and, together with the message
and accompanying paper::;, was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
and was ordered to be printed for use of the Senate

THE WHITE HousE, August 8, 1963.
To the Senate of the United States:
With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to
ratification, I transmit herewith a certified copy of the treaty banning
nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater,
signed at Moscow on August 5, 1963, on behalf of the United States
of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
This treaty is the first concrete result of 18 years of effort by the
United States to impose limits on the nuclear arms race. There is
hope that it may lead to further measures to arrest and control the
dangerous competition for increasingly destructive weapons.
99-118
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The provisions of the treaty are explained in the report of the Acting
Secretary of State, transmitted herewith. Essentinlly it prohibits
only those nuclear tests th~tt we oursalves can police. It permits
nuclear tests and explosions underground so long as nil fallout is
contained within the country where the test or explosion is conducted.
In the weeks before and after the test han negotiations, the hopes
of the world hnYe been focused on this tre~tty. Espeei~tlly in America,
whe1e nuclear energ~· was first unlocked, when' the dn.n~er of nudenr
Witr ~:wd the rne~wing of mdioaetive fallout nrc so C'len.rly reeogni7ed,
there htts been understanding tLnd support for this effort. No\,,- th"
tre~tty comes before the Senate, for that careful stud~· which is the
constitutional obligation of the members of tlmt body. As th~tt studY
begins I wish to urge that the following considerations bf' kept elearl~·
in rnind:
First: This trCtl.ty is the whole agre(}ment. CS. negotiators in
~Iosrow were instrueted not to make this agreement conditioned
upon tm~· other understanding; and they mn.dc non€.'. The treH.ty
speaks for itself.
Second: This treaty n.dntnces, though it does not nssure, world
peace; 1tnd it will inhibit, though it does not prohibit, th€.' nuclear
11t'IHS nLCP.

·while it does not prohibit the "Gnited Sb1tes and the Soviet
Onion front eng1tging in all nurlear tests, it will mdicnll)· limit
the teslin~ in which both nations would otherwise engage.
While it will not hn.lt the produetion or reduce the existing
· stockpiles of nudettr wea.pons, it is a first step toward limiting
the nuclear ttrms race.
While it w!ll not end the threat of nuclear war or outlaw the
use of nuclear "·capons, it can reduce world tensions, open tt way
to further agreements, and thereby help to ease the lhretlt of war.
lVhile it c~tnnol wholly prennt the spread of nuclear tl.rtns to
ntltion not now possessing them, it prohibits assistn.nce to testing
in these em·ironments by others; it will be signed b)· many other
potential tcstf'rs; and it is thus an imporltmt opening wedge in
our effort to "get the genie back in the bottle."
Third: The treaty will curb the pollution of our atmosphere. While
it does not assure the world that it will be forever free from the fears
and dangers of radioactive fallout from atmospheric tests, it will greatly
reduce the numbers and dangers of such tests.
Fourth: This treaty protects our rights in the future. It cannot
be amended without the ronsent of the United States, including the
consent of the Senate; and any p!lrty to the trf'aty has the right to
withdraw, upon ~ months' notice, if it decides that extraordinary
events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized
its supreme interests.
Fifth: This treaty does not alter the status of unrecognized regimes.
The provisions relating to ratification by others, and the precedents of
international law, make it rlear that our adherence to this treaty, and
the adherf'nce of any other party, ran in no way acrord or even imply
recognition by the United States or any other nation of any regime
which is not now accorded such recognition.
Sixth: This tre~1ty does not hnJt American nuclear progress. The
United States has more experience in underground testing than any
other nation; and we intend to use this capacity to tn11intain the ade-
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quacy of our arsenal. Our atomic laboratories will mnintnin un active
development progr.un, including underground testing, and we will
he ready to resume testing in the atmosphere if necessary. Continued
res<>arch on developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy will be possible through underground testing.
Seventh: This treaty is not H. substitute for, and docs not diminish
the need for, continued Western and American militar.'- strength to
meet all contingencies. It will not prevent us from building all the
strength that we ne<>d; Rnd it is not a justification for unilaterally
cutting our defensive strength at this time. Our choice is not between
u limited treaty and effective strategic strength- we need and can
have both. The continuous buildup in the power and invulnerability
of our nuclear arsenal in recent years has been an important factor
in persuading others that the time for a limitation has arrived.
Eighth: This treaty will assure the security of the United States
better than continued unlimited testing on both sides. According
to a comprehensive report prepared by the responsible agencies of
Qo,-ernment for the Nationul Security Council, the tests conducted
by both the So,-iet Union and the United States since President
I~isenhower first proposed this kind of treaty in 1959 have not resulted in any substantial alteration in the strategic balance. In
1959 our relative nuclear position was strong enough to make a limited
test ban desirable, and it remains so today. Under this treaty any
gains in nuclear strength and knowledge which could be made by
the tests of any other power - including not only underground tests
but even any illegal tests which might escape detection- could not
be sufficient to offset the ability of our strategic forces to deter or
sun-i \'e a nuclen.r attack and to penetrate and destroy an aggressor's
homeland. We ha,·e, ~md under this treaty we will continue to have,
the nuclear strength that we need. On the other hand, unrestricted
testing- by which other powers could develop all kinds of weapons
through atmospheric tests more cheaply und quicldy than they could
underground- might well lead to a weakening of our security. It is
ti'Ue thn,t the United States would be able to make further progress
if a,tmospheric tests were continued- but so would the Soviet Union
n,nd indeed, so could other nations. It should be remembered that
only one atomic test was requil'ed to complete the development of
the Hiroshima bomb. Clen,rly the security of the United Statesthe security of all man kind - is increased if such tests are prohibited.
Ninth: The risks in clandestine violations under this treaty are far
smnller than the risks in unlimited testing. Underground tests \vill
still be available for wenpo11s development; and other tests, to be
significant, must run substantial risks of detection. I'\ o nation
tempted to violate the treaty can be certain that an attempted violation will go undetected, given the many means of detecting nuclear
explosions. The risks of detection outweigh the potential gains from
violn,tion, and the risk to the Pni tfd States from such violation is
outweighed by the risk of a continued unlimited nuclear arms race.
There is further assmn,nre against clnndestine testing in our ability to
develop nnd deploy additional means of detection, in our determination to maintain our own arsenal through underground tests, and in
our readiness to resume n.tmospheric testing if the artio11s of others
so requrre.
Tenth: This treaty is the product of the steady effort of the U.S.
Go,-ernment in two administrations, and its principles have had the
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explicit upport of both great political parties. It grows out of the
proposal made b.v President Eisenhower in 1959 and the resolution
passed by the Sem1te in that same year; nnd it carries out the explicit
pledges cont<tined in the plu.tforms of both pnrties in 1960. Xothing
has happenNl since then to alter its importance to our security. It is
also consistent with the proposals this administration put forward in
1961 and 1962 - and with the resolution introduced in the Senate,
with wide bipn.rtisn.n support, in May of 1963.
This tren.t.y is in our national interest. While experience teaches
us to be cn.utiou.;; in our expectations and ever vigilant in our preparations, there is no reason to oppose this hopeful step. It is rarely
possible to reca.pture missed opportunities to achieve n. more secure
and peaceful world. To govern is to choose; and it is my judgment
that the United Stntes should move swiftly to make the most of the
present opportunity nnd approve the pending treaty. I strongly
recommend that the Senate of the United States advise nnd consent
to its rMificution.
DEPARTMENT OF STA'l'E,

Washington, A?.tgust 8, 1963.
THE PRESIDENT,

The H'hite House:
[have the honor to submit to you, with the recommendation that it
he transmitteJ to the Senate for its advice and conf'ent to r»tification,
a certified copy of the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the
atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed at \foscow on
August 5, 1961, on behalf of the United States of Arneri<·a, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Korthern Ireland, and the Pnion of
Soviet So"iali t Republics.
On Odober :31 , 1958, the lTnited States nnd the Pnited Kingdom
began negotiations with the Soviet Union at Grneva for an effertivel~T
controlled mlC'lear test c·essation agreement. As you are aware, continued studies and assessments of the technical, political, militflry, and
other aspects of this subject have been conducted since that time in
connection ,,·ith the neo-otintions.
The Senate has followed tbe test ban negotiations with dose
attention, holding many hearings and enn.cting a resolution in support
of the efrorts of the executive branch (S. ReB. 96, 86th Cong., 1st
sess.) . Congr<:'ssional advisers have attended the negotiations at
Geneva at various times sin('e 1958.
The first proposal for a limited test ban treaty was advanced by
the Cnitf'Cl ;3tates and the enited Kingdom on April 1:~, 1959. On
that date, supported by Prime ~linister ~In.crnillan, President
Eisenhower proposed in a letter to Chairman Khrushchev a ban 011
tests above ground and up to 50 kilometers. On September 3, 1961.
you and Prime :\Iinister ~Iacmillan proposed to Chairman Khrushchev
tbat the three Governments agree immediately not to conduc·t
"nudear tests which Lake place in the atmosphere and produce
radioactive fallout."
On August 27, 1962, the Cnited States and the Lrnited Kingdom
submitted to the Uonference of the 18-Kation Committee on Disarmament a draft treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space, n.nd underwater. Both proposals lw.ve been
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ren<'wed hv tlw l~nited Stutes und thr l ~nited Kingdom at nmous
time!' Rin<·<; then.
~
On .:\luy 27, HHi:~, Srnators Dodd and Humphrey introduced in the
Senate tt r<'solution (S. Res. 14~, ~Mh ('ong., 1st sess.). This n'solution, cosponsorNl by :32 other Senators, urged negotitltion of n treaty
lmnning tests in the atmosphere and the ocenns.
On .Tune 10, 196:3, in a speech at Anwrican Cni,·ersity, you !lllnounred further negotiations with th<' Soviet l'nion for a nudear test
ban, and a suspension of Gnited States tests in the atmosphere so long
as other nations did not conduct them.
On July 2, 1963, Chairman Khrushchev expressed the willingness of
the Soviet Government "to conclude an agreement banning nuclear
tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water."
Commencing July 15, 1963, negotiations were held in Moscow between "\V. Averell Harriman, representing the United States, Lord
Hailsham, representing the United Kingdom, and A. A. Gromyko. representing the Soviet Union, looking toward the possibility of concluding
a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in three environments, but not
underground. On July 25, 1963, these negotiations resulted in an
agreed draft initialed by the representatives of each of the parties.
On August 5, 1963, the treaty was signed in Moscow by Secretary
Rusk on behalf of the United States, by A. A. Gromyko on behalf of
the Cnion of Soviet Socialist Republics, and by Lord Home on behalf
of the United Kingdom.
The treaty consists of a preamble and five articles.
The preamble indicates the relationship of this treaty to the much
broader aim of achieving an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control, as well as to the more
specific aims of eventually preventing nuclear weapons tests in all
environments, meanwhile stopping the contamination of the atmosphere by radimlCtive fallout.
Article I contains the principal substnntive obligations of the parties.
Under its first paragraph the parties undertake to prohibit, to prevent,
and not to carry out, at any place under their jmisdiction or control,
nuclear weapons tests or other nuclear e.:orplosions in the atmosphere,
in outer space, or under wilter. In the context of provisions devoted
to obtaining a complete, verifiable biln on tests in these three environments, the treaty hmguage relates "any nuclear weilpon test explosion"
to "any otller nuclear ex-plosion," thus preventing evilsion based on
the contention that ll pnrticular detonation wus not a weapon test
but the explosion of nn already tested device. The phrase "nny other
nuclmtr explosion" includes explosions for peaceful purposes. Such
explosions nrc prohibited by the trenly becnuse of the difficulty of
differentinting bet ween weapon test explosions nnd peaceful explosions
without ndditionnl controls. The article does not prohibit the use of
nuclear weapons in the event of war nor restrict the exercise of the
right of self-defense recognized in article 51 of the Charter of the
Cnited X ntions.
Cnderground nuclear explosions are not prohibited so long as they
do not cause radioactive debris to be present outside the territori~1l
limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosions
are conducted. Thus, so long as adequate precautions are taken to
prevent such spread of radioactive debris, the treaty will not prohibit
the Cnited States from conducting underground nuclear weapons
tests or underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.
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The second paragraph of article I contains an undertaking by the
parties to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way part.icipating in, the carrying out of the prohibited tests and explosions
anywhere by anyone. This provision prevents a party from doing
indirectly what it has agreed to refrain from doing directly.
Article II contains a procedure for amending the treaty. Any
party may propose an amendment, and a conference to consider such
an amendment must be called if requested by one-third or more of
the parties although a conference would not be necessary for the
adoption of an amendment. To be effective, an amendment must. be
approved and ratified by a majority of all the parties which must include the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. Thus,
no amendment can become effective witbout the advice and consent
of the Senate.
Article III provides that the treaty shall enter into force upon tbe
deposit of instruments of ratification by all three original parties and
specifies how other states may become parties. It designates the
three original parties as depositary governments and contains other
provisions of a formal nature relating to ratification, accession, and
registration with the United Nations.
An increasing number of countries have indicated their intention
of becoming parties to the treaty and of thus broadening its effectiveness. The provisions for signature and accession have bern
designed to permit the widest possible application of the treaty. At
the same time adherence to the treaty will in no way imply recognition
or change in status of regimes the United States does not now
recognize. Nor will it in any way result in according recognition or
change in status to any regime not now recognized by any other party.
Article IV provides that the treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
It also creates a special right of withdrawal, upon 3 months' notice, if
a party finds that extraordinary events related to the subject mattrr
of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.
Article V provides that the English and Russian texts of the treaty
are equally authoritative and makes provision for the deposit of the
original treaty instruments and the transmittal of certified copies to
signatory and acceding states.
There is transmitted for your information, and for that of the
Senate, the agreed communique issued by the representatives of the
original parties on July 25, 1963, at the conclusion of the Conference
in Moscow at which the treaty was formulated.
I believe that the signing of this treaty is a significant achievement.
Its ratification by the three original parties and by such other states
as may sign or accede to it will be an important and hopeful step
toward the reduction of international tensions, alleviation of the fears
and dangers caused by radioactive fallout, and the prevention of the
spread of nuclear weapons capability. I believe it will promote the
security of the United States and of the entire free world.
In view of these advantages, and of the hopes and expectations of
Yirtually every nation in the world, it is my sincere hope that the
United States will promptly ratify this treaty.
Respectfully submitted.
GEORGE

w.

BALL.

(Enclosures: (1) certified copy of the treaty and (2) copy of agreed
communique.)
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TnEA'rY BAXXTXG X t · cLE.\R 'YEAPOX TEs Ts IX THE AT~rosPHERE, IN
01:TER SPAC E AXD rxnER 'YATER

The ,Govrrnments of the rnited States of America, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Xorthern Ireland, and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the "Original
Parties",
Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under
strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the
United ~ ations which would put an end to the armaments rare and
eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of
weapons, including nuclear weapons,
Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of
nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to
this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's
environment by radioactive substances,
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I

1. Each of th<' Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to
pr('vent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or
any other nurlear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or
control:
(n.) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or
underwater, including territorial waters or high seas; or
(b) in any other environment if such explosion causes rad10act1ve
debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under
whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. It is
understood in this connection that the provisions of this subparagraph
are without prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the
permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such
explosions underground, the conclusion of which, as the Parties have
stated in the Preamble to this Treaty, they seek to achieve.
2. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes furthermore to
refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in,
the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other
nuclenr explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the
environments described, or have the effect referred to, in paragraph 1
of this Article.
ARTICLE II

1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text
of n.ny proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary
Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to this Treaty.
Thereafter, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties,
the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which
they shall invite all the Parties, to consider such amendment.
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority
of the votes of all the Pnrties to this Treaty, including the votes of all
of the Original Parties. The amendment shall enter into force for
all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority
of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all of
the Original Parties.
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ARTIC'LE III

1. This Tn•nty ~hall b<• open to all States for si~naturc . Any :--;tat<•
which doe::s not si~n this TrPaty before its entry into foree in IH'<·ord!\llce with pant~ruph 3 of tltis Article may aeeede to it ut any time.
2. This Trrnt:r shall be subject to ratificntion by si~natory Stat<•::s.
Instruments of rntifkation and instruments of nC'ccssion shall be deposited with the Governments of the Original Parties- the "C nit ed
Stutes of America, the United Kin~dom of Greut Britain ttnd Xorthern
Ireland, tllld the Cnion of Soviet Soeialist Rt·publies- whieh are
hereby designnted the Depositary Governments.
3. Tltis Treu.ty shall enter into force after its ratificntion bv ttll the
Original Parties ·und the deposit of their instruments of mtification.
4. For Stntes whose instruments of ratifieution or accession nn•
deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shnll
enter into for<"e on the date of the deposit of their instruments of
mtificntion or aceession.
5. The Depositary Govrrnments shall promptly inform all signatory nnd aeerding Stt1tes of the date of ench signatun•, the dnt<• of
del)osi t of eneh 1nstrumen t of ratification of aitd nc·(·pssion to t hi~
Treaty, the dnte of its entry into force, nnd the dntr of receipt of nny
requests for eonferenc£'s or other notices.
6. Tltis Tren.ty shall lw registered by the DPpositary Governm<•n ts
pursuant to Artid£' 102 of the ('hart£'r of tlw l ·nitt•d ~ntions.
AHTICLE IV

Tltis Trentv shall be of unlimited dumtion .
E1wh Part~- sltall in ('X£'reising its uutionnl sonrei~uty hnn t h,.
right to wit hdr:t w from t h<> Treatv if it <k<"idPs t hn t <>xtmonlinan
e~·ents. related to the subj£'d mnttcr of this Tr"aty, hnw jt>opardizl'~l
the supreme intrrrsts of its country. It shall gin notice of such
withdmwnl to nil other Parties to the Tr£'nly thr£'£' months in ndvnJH'<'.
ARTICLE Y

This Trraty, of which the Eng-lish and Russinn t£'xts are equally
nuthentic, shall he deposited in the arch ives of th<> DPpositnry Govcrnrnents. Duly crrtified copies of this Tr<>aty shall lw trnnsmittNI
by the Depositary Gowrnments to th£' Gon'rnnwnts of the si~nntory
aud acceding States.
Ix \VITXE:-;s WIIEHEOI-' the undersign<'d, duly authorizrd. lwve si~n<'d
this Treatv.
DoxE itt triplicatp at the Pity of ~loscow thP fifth day of ~\u~ust.
one thousand nine hundred awl sixtv-three.
For the Gonrnnwnt of th<' rnite(l Stntl·s of Amcricu:
DEAX HnsK

WAil
For thr Gowrnnwnt of the CnitNl Kingdom of Great Tiritain and
X orthern Ireland :
Ho~m

H
For the Gowrnmrnt of the Gnion of Soviet Socialist Republics :
A. GHOMYKO

A.G.
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I certify that the foregoing is n true copy of the Trefity banning
nuclenr wenpon tests in the tiliHosphere in outer space tmd under
water, signed nt :\Ioscow on ~\ugust :>, 196:3 in the English and Russian l:lnguages, a signed original of which is deposited in the archives
of the Government of the Cnited Stntes of America.
lx TESTDfOXY \\'HERE•JF, I, George \V. Ball, Acting Secrehiry of
~bile of the Cnited Stntes of AmericR, have hereunto caused the seal
of the Department of State to be affixed and my name subscribed by
the .\uthentication Officer of the said Department, at the city of
Washington, in the District of C'olumbifi, this eighth day of August,
19():3.
GEOHGE \V. ll.\LL
(::m.\L]
Acting Secretary of State
By B.\.RBAHA IL\HTM.\.~
Authentication Officer
Department of State
[Released on July 25, 1963]
AGREED CoMMUNIQUE

Tlw spcrinl rPprescntatives of the President of the United States
of .\mericu nnd of the Prime .\[inister of the United Kingdom,
\r..\verell Harriman, ender Secretary of State Jor Political Affairs
of I h(' Cnited States, and Lord Hailsham, Lord President of the
Coun<"il and :\[inister of Science for the Cnited Kingdom, visited
.\Ios("ow together with their advisers on July 14. :\Ir. Harriman and
Lord llailsham were received by the Chnirman of the Coun<'il of
.\Iinisters of the Cnion of So,riet Socialist Republics, K. S. Khrushchev,
who presided on ,July 1.5 at the first of a series of meetings to discuss
que::;tions relating to the discontinuance of nudear tests, and other
questions of mutual interest. The discussions ,.,·ere continued from
.July 1G to ,July 2.!) with A. A. Gromyko, \finist«:>r of Foreign Affairs
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. During these discussions
eac·h principal was nssistrd by his advisers.
The dis<"ussions took place in a businesslike, cordial atmosphere.
Agreement was reac·hed on the text of a treaty banning nuclear
,,·rnpons tests in the atmosphere, in outer spac-e and under water.
This text is being published separately and simultaneously with this
c·omrntmique. It was initialed on July 25 by A. A. Gromyko,
.\[r. Harriman and Lord Hailsham. ~Ir. Harriman and Lord
IIailsham together with their advisers will leave ~1oseow shortl.v
to report and bring back the initialed texts to their respective Governments. Signature of the treaty is expected to take place in the near
future in .\fos<"OW.
·
The heads of the three delegations agreed that the test ban treaty
c·onstituted an important first step toward the reduction of international tension and the strengthening of peace, and they look forwnrd to further progress in this direction.
The heads of the three delegations discussed the Soviet proposal
relnting to a pact of non-aggression between the participants in the
Xorth Atlantic Treaty Organization and the participants in the
'Ynrsaw Treat~-. The three Governments have agreed fully to inform their resper'tive allies in the two organizations concerning these
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talks and to consult with them about continuing discussions on this
question with the purpose of achieving agreement satisfactory to all
participants. A brief exchange of views also took place with regard
to other measures, directed at a eelaxntion of tension.
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